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DUE PROCESS AND THE DETERMINATION OF
PAIN AND SUFFERING TORT DAMAGES
Mark A. Geistfeld*
In a line of relatively recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that a tort award of punitive damages must satisfy the procedural and
substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution.1 Of all damage types, the Court so far has expressly applied
due process requirements only to punitive damages. But as Justices
Scalia and Thomas have argued, "[I]f the Court is correct, it must be
that every claim that a state jury's award of compensatory damages is
'unreasonable' (because not supported by the evidence) amounts to
an assertion of a constitutional injury.' '2 This claim is most compelling
with respect to pain-and-suffering damages. As others have con-
cluded, these damages appear to be particularly problematic as a mat-
ter of due process.3
Part II provides further reasons for concluding that pain-and-suffer-
ing damages are posing a constitutional problem. In the Court's most
recent case evaluating the constitutionality of a punitive damages
award, it justified the due process inquiry by relying upon a set of
constitutional concerns regarding punitive damages. 4 These constitu-
tional concerns all apply to pain-and-suffering damages.
Part III identifies the source of the constitutional problem. Judges
routinely instruct jurors that there is no way to determine pain-and-
suffering damages other than by reference to what is just or fair.
* Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Copyright 2006
Mark A. Geistfeld.
1. In 1989, the Court left open the question "whether due process acts as a check on undue
jury discretion to award punitive damages in the absence of any express statutory limit." Brown-
ing-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 277 (1989). A decisive, affirmative answer
to that question was provided by the Court a few years later in BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
2. Gore, 517 U.S. at 606 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
3. See Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compen-
satory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231 (2003); Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing
Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859, 907-08 (1991); see also 2
DAN B. DOBBs, THE LAW OF TORTS 1051 (2001) ("The claim of pain is therefore a serious threat
to the defendant since, lacking any highly objective components, it permits juries to roam
through their biases in setting an award.").
4. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417-18 (2003).
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When juries determine damages on this basis, the tort award most
plausibly involves a normative or value judgment concerning the
amount of money that "can symbolize public respect for rights and
public recognition of the transgressor's fault by requiring something
important to be given up on one side and received on the other, even
if there is no equivalence of value possible."' 5 The damages award
redresses the rights-violation without representing any "equivalence
of value" because the plaintiff's right to physical security is not com-
mensurate with or directly comparable to money. The individual right
to bodily integrity is simply not fungible with money. This conception
of the tort right explains why jury instructions routinely state that
there is no way to equate the injury or rights-violation with money.
The concept, however, also implies that the damages award for the
rights-violation involves an excessive amount of juror discretion in vi-
olation of due process.
Part IV discusses the potential impact of due process on tort awards
for pain and suffering. The current procedure for determining these
damages could be constitutionally defective, requiring wholesale
change. Even if the current procedure does not produce per se consti-
tutional violations, the jury's determination of damages does not plau-
sibly involve a finding of fact, and so the damages award should be
subject to de novo judicial review for cases in which the defendant
challenges the award as being excessive in violation of substantive due
process. In evaluating the constitutionality of a punitive damages
award, judges must apply a set of factors identified by the Court.6
Such an inquiry might also be required for the de novo review of pain-
and-suffering damages.
Jury awards of pain-and-suffering damages are not inherently vul-
nerable to these constitutional restrictions, however. Part V explains
why the plaintiff's tort right provides a constitutionally sound method
for determining pain-and-suffering damages. As a corollary of the
tort right, the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff. To deter-
mine the substantive content of the duty-the safety precautions re-
quired of the defendant-the standard of care must compare the cost
of precaution to the injuries threatened by the risky conduct. To make
this comparison, the standard of care must monetize the pain-and-suf-
fering injury. A well-established methodology exists for making such
a determination. The resultant monetary measure of the injury does
not represent a "value" of the injury or the tort right, but merely rep-
5. Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 69 (1993).
6. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418.
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resents the safety demands that this particular injury imposes on the
duty-holder. This monetary measure also provides a good basis for
the damages award. To violate the plaintiff's right, the defendant
must have breached the duty of care in a manner that caused injury to
the plaintiff. The rights-violation links the duty of care to the injury,
making it defensible to formulate the damages remedy in these terms.
Redress of the rights-violation therefore can depend upon the mone-
tary measure of the injury that is employed within the standard of
care. Not only is this method an appropriate way to protect the plain-
tiff's tort right, it also involves a finding of fact by the jury. When
based on this method, pain-and-suffering damages are secure from the
attacks of due process.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
In its most recent case addressing the constitutionality of a punitive
damages award, the Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Campbell identified four different constitutional "concerns"
that justify constraining those awards as a matter of due process.7
Each of these concerns also applies to pain-and-suffering damages,
implying that due process also constrains these tort awards.8
A. The First Constitutional Concern: The Nature of the
Defendant's Interests
Under Mathews v. Eldridge,9 the "specific dictates of due process"
depend upon three factors, including "the private interest that will be
affected by the official action." 10 Consistent with this test, the Court's
first constitutional concern with punitive damages addresses the na-
ture of the defendant's interests: "Although these awards serve the
same purposes as criminal penalties, defendants subjected to punitive
damages in civil cases have not been accorded the protections applica-
ble in a criminal proceeding. This increases our concerns over the im-
precise manner in which punitive damages systems are
administered.""
A defendant's private interest in liberty is at stake in a criminal
prosecution. This justifies procedural safeguards more demanding
than those required for civil actions, which impose monetary liability
7. Id. at 417-18.
8. My argument in this section is drawn from Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1095-1111 (2005).
9. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
10. Id. at 335.
11. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417.
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on the defendant. By concluding that punitive damages "serve the
same purposes as criminal penalties," the Court apparently can justify
procedural safeguards for punitive damages that would seem to be
more demanding than the safeguards required for other forms of tort
liability. A similarity of purpose implies that punitive damages and
criminal liability implicate similar interests of the defendant, thereby
requiring similar procedural safeguards for the analogous forms of
liability.
The Court bases this constitutional concern entirely on the fact that
both criminal penalties and punitive damages "are aimed at deter-
rence and retribution. 1 2 The Court clearly assumes that the criminal
law and tort law identically interpret the purposes of deterrence and
retribution. Upon scrutiny, the assumption is unwarranted. Criminal
penalties can further aims of deterrence and retribution that are fun-
damentally different from those furthered by punitive damages.
According to a leading treatise: "The broad aim of the criminal law
is, of course, to prevent harm to society .... This it accomplishes by
punishing those who have done harm, and by threatening with punish-
ment those who would do harm, to others. ' 13 Criminal liability pun-
ishes the defendant for the wrong suffered by the public. 14 So too,
criminal penalties are formulated to deter members of the public from
committing crimes-a purpose commonly called "general
deterrence."15
Unlike the criminal law, tort law is based upon individual rights and
a corresponding set of individual duties. 16 As a result of this individ-
ual right-duty nexus, tort law can tailor punitive damages to punish
the defendant duty-holder for the way in which he or she violated the
plaintiff's right, while also deterring the defendant from violating the
12. See id. at 416.
13. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(e) (2d ed. 2003).
14. See, e.g., 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 474 (1998) (stating that "a crime is by definition
a public wrong, one against all the people of the state"). For a good discussion on the impor-
tance of limiting criminal liability to public punishment rather than private punishment, see
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 35-40 (1998).
15. General deterrence is "the tendency of people who have not yet been sanctioned to be
deterred by the prospect of sanctions for committing an illegal act." STEVEN S. SHAVELL, FOUN-
DATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 515 (2004). Criminal liability necessarily involves
general deterrence, because criminal penalties must be set prospectively for any given category
or class of conduct. See LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 1.2(d) (describing necessity of prescribed
criminal penalties).
16. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that a tort
plaintiff can recover only by showing that the defendant's breach of duty constitutes "'a wrong'




plaintiff's right in the future-a purpose commonly called "individual
or specific deterrence. 1 7
Thus, criminal liability and punitive damages can each serve the
aims of punishment and deterrence without sharing a similarity of
purpose, contrary to what the Court has assumed. Criminal liability
provides retribution for public wrongs and the necessary incentives for
general deterrence, whereas punitive damages can provide retribution
for private wrongs and the necessary incentives for individual
deterrence.
To illustrate this difference, consider a case involving a defendant
who repeatedly drove her truck over the plaintiff's land in order to
reduce considerably the travel distance between the defendant's prop-
erty and her desired destination. Each trespass did not otherwise
damage the land, so the defendant knew she would only have to pay
nominal damages to the plaintiff landowner as compensation for each
trespass. Reasoning that the nominal damages for trespass are less
costly than the added travel time otherwise required for the trip, the
defendant decided to commit trespass on an ongoing basis. The de-
fendant's behavior warrants punitive damages. By behaving in this
manner, the defendant has tried to convert the plaintiff's right to ex-
clusive possession of the land into an easement without obtaining the
requisite consent from the plaintiff. As the defendant's behavior
reveals, the plaintiff's right to exclusive possession cannot be ade-
quately protected by compensatory damages. Protection of the right
requires punitive damages. This extra-compensatory damages award
punishes the defendant for not previously respecting the plaintiff's
right to exclusive possession, while further protecting the right by giv-
ing the defendant an incentive not to trespass in the future. The puni-
tive damages award is tailored to protect the plaintiff's right and
nothing else. In effect, these damages force the defendant to stay off
the property or otherwise obtain the plaintiff's consent for the ease-
ment, the result required by the plaintiff's right to exclusive possession
of the land.
Punitive damages therefore can be justified exclusively as a means
of protecting the plaintiff's individual tort right from wrongful in-
fringements by the defendant, just as other forms of tort liability can
17. "[T]he notion of individual deterrence (sometimes called particular deterrence or special
deterrence) ... is the tendency of a person who has been penalized for committing an illegal act
to be more deterred from in the future from committing that act than he had been beforehand
by the prospect of sanctions." SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 515.
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be justified as a means of protecting the plaintiff's tort right. 18 Like
any form of tort liability, punitive damages can be formulated to re-
dress a private wrong fundamentally different from the public wrongs
of concern to the criminal law.
To be sure, the trespassing defendant may also be subject to crimi-
nal liability, but that possibility provides another reason for conclud-
ing that punitive damages are not a criminal sanction. After all, if
punitive damages were a criminal penalty for the trespass, then impos-
ing criminal liability on the defendant for the same trespass would
involve double punishment. In addressing this issue, the majority of
courts have "avoided the double jeopardy problem by holding that
punitive damages are punishment, not for the improper act in the ab-
stract, or the wrong that the defendant caused to society, but for the
legal wrong to the individual plaintiff." 19
The Iowa Supreme Court, for example, concluded that
the clear weight of authority is ... that the damages allowed in a
civil case by way of punishment, have no necessary relation to the
penalty incurred for the wrong done to the public: but are called
punitive damages by way of distinction from pecuniary damages,
and to characterize them as a punishment for the wrong done to the
individual. In this view, the awarding of punitive damages can in no
just sense be said to be in conflict with the constitutional or com-
mon law inhibition against inflicting two punishments for the same
offense.20
Hence, the mere fact that punitive damages serve the purpose of
retribution and deterrence does not necessarily turn these damages
into a form of criminal liability, a conclusion with ample historical and
doctrinal support.2 1 Contrary to what the U.S. Supreme Court has
assumed, the objectives of retribution and deterrence do not make
punitive damages analogous to criminal liability for purposes of due
process. The analogy must come from somewhere else.
18. The important tort doctrines can be justified in terms of the individual right to physical
security defined in terms of an interpersonal priority of the security interest over the liberty
interest. See Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91
GEO. L.J. 585 (2003).
19. Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punish-
ment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 622 (2003).
20. Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 391 (1866).
21. For an excellent discussion and thorough analysis of the historical issues, see Colby, supra
note 19. For a contemporary example, see Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 113 Cal. App. 4th 738, 746
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ("There is a fundamental difference between parking fines and drug forfeit-
ures, on the one hand, and punitive damages, on the other .... In the case of punitive damages,
the exaction arises from a 'private' wrong: if there is no wrong resulting in compensable injury to
this plaintiff, there can be no exaction of punitive damages.").
336 [Vol. 55:331
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Under the Mathews test, the due process inquiry depends upon the
nature of the defendant's interests implicated by the form of liabil-
ity.22 The Court therefore could draw a defensible due process anal-
ogy between punitive damages and criminal liability if each form of
liability burdens the same private interests of the defendant. When
formulated in this manner, the due process inquiry shows that any
constitutional concern generated by punitive damages is also gener-
ated by pain-and-suffering damages.
Criminal liability can directly restrict the defendant's liberty interest
by confinement. Tort law also directly restricts the defendant's liberty
interests by imposing behavioral requirements on the defendant as
duty-holder. The negligence standard of reasonable care, for exam-
ple, requires certain conduct on the part of the duty-holder with re-
spect to particular forms of risky behavior. This direct restriction of
liberty is not entailed by punitive damages, unless one concludes that
the prospect of punitive damages provides the incentive for the defen-
dant to comply with the tort duty. So conceptualized, punitive dam-
ages implicate an individual interest that is not fundamentally
different than the interest implicated by pain-and-suffering damages.
Ordinarily, the threat of liability for compensatory damages also gives
the defendant an incentive to behave in the manner required by the
tort duty.23 Insofar as the incentive effects of a damages award pro-
vide the direct restriction of the defendant's liberty interest, there is
no fundamental difference between punitive damages and pain-and-
suffering damages.
Criminal liability can also indirectly restrict the defendant's liberty
interest by the imposition of monetary fines. In this respect, both
criminal liability and punitive damages affect the same interest of the
defendant. But the defendant's private interest pertaining to money is
also implicated by any form of tort liability requiring the payment of
compensatory damages.24
By concluding that the nature of the defendant's private interests
creates a due process concern regarding punitive damages, the Court
has invoked a constitutional concern that also applies to pain-and-suf-
fering damages. Both types of damages burden the same set of pri-
22. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
23. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 127-28.
24. One could also argue that punitive damages implicate different private interests than
those discussed in text because "there is a stigma attached to an award of punitive damages that
does not accompany a purely compensatory award." Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 54 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But stigma can also attach to a compensatory award
based on the nature of the tortious conduct. Negligent behavior can be morally blameworthy, as
are many of the intentional torts such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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vate interests and accordingly require the same due process
protections, unless there is some other constitutional difference be-
tween the two.
B. The Second Constitutional Concern: Arbitrary
Deprivation of Property
Due process protects the defendant from arbitrary or unreasonable
deprivations of property, providing a separate constitutional concern
that the Court in State Farm could invoke to justify a due process con-
straint on the award of punitive damages:
We have admonished that "[p]unitive damages pose an acute dan-
ger of arbitrary deprivation of property. Jury instructions typically
leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the
presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the po-
tential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big
businesses, particularly those without strong local presences. '25
The concern that open-ended jury instructions can result in arbi-
trary or unreasonable deprivations of property also applies to pain-
and-suffering damages. Consider the following pattern jury instruc-
tion from California:
No definite standard [or method of calculation] is prescribed by law
by which to fix reasonable compensation for pain and suffering.
Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount of such
reasonable compensation. [Furthermore, the argument of counsel
as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable compen-
sation.] In making an award for pain and suffering you should exer-
cise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the
damages you fix must be just and reasonable in the light of the
evidence.26
Instructions like these provide juries with little or no guidance. As
tort scholars have long recognized, this approach attempts to evaluate
the "imponderable" by a method of "arbitrary indeterminateness. '27
Even the Court has recognized that jury instructions regarding puni-
tive damages involve an amount of discretion that "is no greater than
25. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (quoting Honda
Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994)).
26. CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 14.13 (2005); see also, Fw-n CIRCUIT, PATIrERN CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 15.4 (2005) ("There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be
awarded for these elements of damage. Any award that you make should be fair in the light of
the evidence.").
27. The quoted language comes from the classic exposition of this position: Louis L. Jaffe,




that" exercised by juries in the determination of pain-and-suffering
damages.28
The wide discretion afforded to juries poses a due process concern
by giving jurors an unreasonable opportunity to base damages on ex-
tralegal factors like bias or prejudice. This concern, though, is gener-
ated by vague jury instructions and is not plausibly limited to punitive
damages. Empirical studies have found that extralegal factors such as
gender, race, socioeconomic status, or physical appearance become
more influential in jury decisionmaking when the legal standards are
the most ambiguous.29 Insofar as juries have a similar amount of dis-
cretion in determining punitive damages and pain-and-suffering dam-
ages, it follows that the possibility of bias applies equally to both.
C. The Third Constitutional Concern: Fair Notice
Due process requires that individuals be given fair notice of what is
required of them by the law, enabling the Court in State Farm to iden-
tify another constitutional concern posed by punitive damages:
[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to classify arbi-
trariness as a virtue. Indeed, the point of due process-of the law in
general-is to allow citizens to order their behavior. A State can
have no legitimate interest in deliberately making the law so arbi-
trary that citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based solely
upon bias or whim.30
By this same reasoning, the vague jury instructions regarding pain-
and-suffering damages cannot be defended because the arbitrariness
is somehow "a virtue," but that is the only real message conveyed by
standard jury instructions.
D. The Fourth Constitutional Concern: Poor Decisionmaking
Vague jury instructions can pose yet another constitutional concern,
as the Court in State Farm explains:
28. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20 (majority opinion) ("The discretion allowed under Alabama law in
determining punitive damages is no greater than that pursued in many familiar areas of the law
as, for example, deciding . . . appropriate compensation for pain and suffering or mental
anguish.").
29. See, e.g., Martin F. Kaplan & Charles E. Miller, Group Decision Making and Normative
Versus Informational Influence: Effects of Type of Issue and Assigned Decision Rule, 53 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 306, 310 (1987) (describing study showing that juror discussions
regarding punitive damages are more likely to involve normative, value-laden judgments than
references to the evidence presented at trial). For a survey of this literature, see Frederick S.
Levin, Note, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for Damages Measurement "Anomie," 22 U.
MiCH. J.L. REFORM 303, 321-22 nn.64-68 (1989).
30. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417-18 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
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Our concerns are heightened when the decisionmaker is presented
•.. with evidence that has little bearing as to the amount of punitive
damages that should be awarded. Vague instructions, or those that
merely inform the jury to avoid "passion or prejudice," do little to
aid the decisionmaker in its task of assigning appropriate weight to
evidence that is relevant and evidence that is tangential or only
inflammatory.31
This final due process concern essentially restates the problem of
overly vague tort rules. The problem of vagueness cannot be elimi-
nated by instructing the jury to avoid "passion or prejudice" in award-
ing punitive damages. So too, the problem cannot be eliminated by
instructing jurors to exercise their "authority with calm and reasona-
ble judgment" in determining pain-and-suffering damages.32 When
jurors must decide an issue without sufficient guidance from the law,
they predictably make decisions that are not based upon an appropri-
ate weighing of the evidence. Unable to discern the proper role of
evidence, jurors are also unable to distinguish relevant evidence from
"evidence that is tangential or only inflammatory."
Poor decisions presumably increase the likelihood of erroneous im-
positions of liability, which in turn increase the likelihood that liability
involves an unreasonable deprivation of the defendant's property in
violation of due process. This constitutional concern need not have
anything to do with the motives or character of the decisionmaker, but
is an inevitable product of vague legal rules.
III. THE SOURCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
In explaining why due process constrains the tort practice of award-
ing punitive damages, the Court relied upon four different constitu-
tional concerns that apply with equal force to pain-and-suffering
damages. As a logical matter, due process must constrain both types
of damages. To establish this point more completely, we need to iden-
tify the reason why pain-and-suffering damages have created the con-
stitutional problem.
As a doctrinal matter, the constitutional problem involves vague
jury instructions. In evaluating a defendant's claim that the procedure
for determining punitive damages violated due process, the Court has
concluded that due process is violated if the jury is given "unlimited
discretion" to determine punitive damages: "As long as the discretion
31. Id. at 418 (quoting Petition for Writ Certiorari at 108a-109a, State Farm, 538 U.S. 408 (No.
01-1289)) (internal citations omitted).
32. CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 14.13 (2005).
[Vol. 55:331
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is exercised within reasonable constraints, due process is satisfied. '33
To see why jury instructions are not providing "reasonable con-
straints" on the award of pain-and-suffering damages, it is worth re-
peating the pattern jury instructions from California:
No definite standard [or method of calculation] is prescribed by law
by which to fix reasonable compensation for pain and suffering.
Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount of such
reasonable compensation. [Furthermore, the argument of counsel
as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable compen-
sation.] In making an award for pain and suffering you should exer-
cise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the
damages you fix must be just and reasonable in the light of the
evidence.34
The only potential constraint on the jury's discretion involves the
instruction that jurors should exercise "reasonable judgment" in
reaching the "just and reasonable award." The instruction to exercise
"reasonable judgment" does not provide a reasonable constraint on
juror discretion. As the Court said in State Farm, "Vague instructions,
or those that merely inform the jury to avoid 'passion or prejudice,' do
little to aid the decisionmaker in its task of assigning appropriate
weight to evidence that is relevant and evidence that is tangential or
only inflammatory. ' 35 This requirement is not satisfied by the Califor-
nia jury instructions, particularly since jurors are also told that "[n]o
definite standard [or method of calculation] is prescribed by law by
which to fix reasonable compensation for pain and suffering." Lack-
ing any prescribed method, these jury instructions do not provide any
reasonable constraints on jury decisionmaking.
This conclusion finds support in various empirical studies. Jurors
have reported that they "find the guidance that is given to them on
how to compute damages to be minimal .... "36 In one products lia-
bility case, jurors said they used a process of "guesstimation" to deter-
33. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-20.
34. CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 14.13 (2005); see also FIFrH CIRCUIT, PATrERN CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 15.4 (2005) ("There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be
awarded for these elements of damage. Any award that you make should be fair in the light of
the evidence.").
35. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418 (quoting Petition for Writ Certiorari at 108a-109a, State Farm,
538 U.S. 408 (No. 01-1289)) (internal citations omitted).
36. Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who




mine pain-and-suffering damages. 37 Another study found that jurors
"used different methods of calculating the awards. '38
The vague jury instructions predictably result in highly variable
damage awards. Plaintiffs who suffer more severe injuries tend to re-
ceive higher awards (indicating some degree of "vertical equity"), but
those with similar pain-and-suffering injuries often are awarded signif-
icantly different amounts of damages (indicating a lack of "horizontal
equity").39 The jury instructions produce highly variable damage
awards by permitting jurors to rely upon a variety of methods for cal-
culating pain-and-suffering damages. Different methods predictably
yield different results. One method can easily produce a damages
award twice as great as the amount produced by a different method. 40
This due process problem would continue to exist even if jurors
were given more explicit instruction on the nature and purpose of
pain-and-suffering damages, each of which is described in the follow-
ing passage by the New York Court of Appeals:
An economic loss can be compensated in kind by an economic gain;
but recovery for noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering and
loss of enjoyment of life rests on the "legal fiction that money dam-
ages can compensate for a victim's injury." We accept this fiction,
knowing that although money will neither ease the pain nor restore
the victim's abilities, this device is as close as the law can come in its
effort to right the wrong. We have no hope of evaluating what has
been lost, but a monetary award may provide a measure of solace
for the condition created.41
Jury instructions formulated in these terms would not give jurors
any idea about how to determine the award. The instructions would
still only tell the jury that it must reach the fair or just outcome with-
out providing any guidance on what fairness or justice requires in this
context. Due process requires that jury instructions provide reasona-
ble constraints on juror discretion. Is this constitutional requirement
satisfied by instructions that effectively tell jurors, one way or another,
that the damages award is no more than a "legal fiction"?
37. Edith Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 230 (1989).
38. Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain
and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 254-55 (1993).
39. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 924 (1989).
40. Cf Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suf-
fering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (finding that the way in which jury instructions are
worded has a substantial impact on the amount of "full compensation" that individuals award for
a given pain-and-suffering injury, with some instructions yielding a fully compensatory pain-and-
suffering award twice as great as the amount yielded by other instructions).
41. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374-75 (N.Y. 1989) (internal citations omitted).
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The constitutional problem becomes even more acute when consid-
ered in relation to the underlying rationale for this conception of pain-
and-suffering damages. The best explanation of this rationale has
been provided by Margaret Jane Radin:
Requiring payment is a way both to bring the wrongdoer to recog-
nize that she has done wrong and to make redress to the victim.
Redress is not restitution or rectification. Redress instead means
showing the victim that her rights are taken seriously. It is accom-
plished by affirming that some action is required to symbolize pub-
lic respect for the existence of certain rights and public recognition
of the transgressor's fault in disrespecting those rights. In this con-
ception of compensation, neither the harm to the victim nor to the
victim's right not to be harmed are commensurate with money.
They are not conceptually equated as fungible commodities.42
The conception of pain-and-suffering damages as involving redress
for an "incommensurable" injury persuasively explains why judges tell
jurors that there is no way to equate the injury or rights-violation with
money, even though money damages are the only way to redress the
rights-violation. The tort right is not a "fungible commodity" with
money, and so there can be no "direct equivalence" between the
rights-violation and a monetary damages award. But since a damages
award is the only way for the jury to redress the rights-violation, at
best the award can only represent "public recognition of the transgres-
sor's fault in disrespecting those rights." The jury, in short, can only
do what is just or fair in the circumstances-the instruction routinely
provided by judges.
But if the tort right necessarily implies that the injury cannot be
translated into some monetary amount, then a wide range of awards
would seem to be appropriate, eliminating any reasonable constraint
on jury decisionmaking. 43 The very nature of the tort right would be
the source of the constitutional problem.
42. Radin, supra note 5, at 61.
43. The concept of incommensurability is itself contested, but the different conceptions all
seem to create the problem of excessive jury discretion. Under a "strong" form of incommensu-
rability, "there is no basis in our knowledge of value to say that one decision rather than the
other was the correct one." Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor
Schauer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 813, 816 (1994). If pain-and-suffering damages are incommensurable
in this sense, then the jury does indeed have unfettered discretion. A "weaker" form of incom-
mensurability maintains that there is no "common dimension of measurement that would allow
trade-offs between" the pain-and-suffering injury and money, although "there is certainly a table
or an order of priority, just as there is an order of suits in a bridge contract or an order of letters
in the alphabet." Id. at 817. Presumably, the ordering would prioritize the right to bodily integ-
rity over money. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (explaining why the tort right is
based upon this priority). The absence of any "common dimension of measurement" between
the differently ordered priorities would seem to give the jury unfettered discretion for determin-
ing how the prioritized rights-violation translates into a lower order monetary damages award.
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For this reason, the constitutional problem has not been solved by
judicial review. Absent evidence that jurors relied on extralegal fac-
tors in deriving the award, what meaningful criteria can be applied by
judges to evaluate the award? As Eric Schnapper has observed, the
open-ended nature of the damages determination creates a particu-
larly problematic situation for appellate review, because "[t]he jury
itself must exercise considerable discretion in fixing the amount of the
verdict; the trial judge in turn exercises broad discretion in approving
or rejecting the jury's action. This double exercise of discretion seems
inconsistent with virtually any direct appellate review of these ver-
dicts."' 44 The difficulty of appellate review further underscores the
constitutional problem, since judicial review of the damages award is
required by procedural due process. 45
Perhaps the reviewing court could evaluate the award in terms of its
comparability with prior awards for similar injuries. 46 But this ap-
proach inappropriately assumes that prior awards are constitutionally
sound. As the Court concluded in a related context, "Retrospective
case-by-case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a
class of proceedings is governed by a constitutionally defective eviden-
tiary standard. ' 47 Garbage in. Garbage out.
Rather than solve the problem of procedural due process, judicial
review merely shifts the problem from jurors to judges. The constitu-
tional problem cannot be avoided insofar as it is created by the under-
lying tort right.
IV. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DUE PROCESS ON
PAIN-AND-SUFFERING DAMAGES
The current procedure for determining pain-and-suffering damages
may be constitutionally defective and needs to be changed accord-
ingly. But even if the current procedure does not suffer from this
problem, the defendant can also challenge a pain-and-suffering award
as being excessive in violation of substantive due process. This consti-
tutional challenge makes it necessary to consider how due process
might affect the judicial review of the damages award.
44. Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries-Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts,
1989 Wis. L. REV. 237, 340.
45. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 427 n.5, 434 (1994) (finding that the Oregon
Constitution's prohibition of the reexamination of any "fact tried by a jury" violated due process
by not allowing for any judicial review of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards).
46. See, e.g., David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments:
A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms
and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109 (1995).
47. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 743, 757 (1982).
[Vol. 55:331
DUE PROCESS
In evaluating substantive due process challenges to a punitive dam-
ages award, the Court has held that the amount of punitive damages
involves a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to de novo
appellate review.48 Under this approach, judges first identify the rele-
vant substantive purposes that are supposed to be served by the
award. Judges then engage in de novo review of the damages award
to determine whether the amount is reasonable in light of the substan-
tive purposes that should be served by the damages award.
The form of judicial review required by substantive due process
would have less of an impact on tort practice if the reviewing courts
did not engage in de novo review. For a damages determination in-
volving a question of fact decided by the jury, both state and federal
constitutional guarantees limit the scope of judicial review. For exam-
ple, a finding of fact by a federal jury is governed by the Seventh
Amendment's Reexamination Clause, which limits federal appellate
review to a determination of whether the district court abused its
discretion. 49
Ninety years ago, the Court held that a damages award for pain and
suffering "involves only a question of fact and is not open to reconsid-
eration here."' 50 Recently, the Court has suggested that this holding
continues to be valid.51 The holding, however, cannot be squared with
the Court's recent pronouncements on punitive damages, creating the
possibility that substantive due process requires de novo appellate re-
view of pain-and-suffering damages, the same type of appellate review
now applied to punitive damages.
The Court has said that a damages determination involves a finding
of fact if it "presents a question of historical or predictive fact."'52
Pain-and-suffering damages clearly depend upon both the historical
fact of the injury already suffered by the plaintiff and the predictive
fact of the future pain and suffering the plaintiff is likely to endure.
But punitive damages also depend upon historical facts (the nature of
the defendant's wrongdoing) and predictive facts (the way in which
punitive damages will deter the defendant from engaging in future
48. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001) ("Be-
cause the jury's award of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of 'fact,' [de novol
appellate review of the district court's determination that an award is consistent with due process
does not implicate the Seventh Amendment" guarantee of the right of trial by jury.).
49. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432-39 (1996).
50. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 661 (1915).
51. The Court has recently cited Craft in support of the claim that "the measure of actual
damages suffered ...presents a question of historical or predictive fact" unlike the level of




wrongdoing). By holding that punitive damages do not involve a pure
finding of fact, the Court has implicitly rejected the claim that a find-
ing of fact only requires some dependence upon historical or predic-
tive facts. A finding of fact must instead entirely depend upon
historical or predictive facts that presumably do not involve any sort
of normative or value judgment.
This reasoning explains why punitive damages -involve a mixed
question of law and fact. Punitive damages serve the purposes of ret-
ribution and deterrence. 53 The appropriate amount of damages for
retributive purposes clearly involves some sort of normative or value
judgment, enabling the Court to conclude that an award of punitive
damages does not involve a finding of fact and therefore is subject to
de novo appellate review.
The jury's determination of pain-and-suffering damages also in-
volves some sort of normative or value judgment whenever jurors are
not provided with a method for translating pain and suffering into a
damages award. Lacking any guidelines, the jury must rely on value
judgments, explaining why jurors are often instructed to use their
"collective enlightened conscience" in reaching an award that is "fair
and just. ' 54 These jury instructions make clear that the damages de-
pend upon a normative or value judgment, a dependence that makes
pain-and-suffering damages a mixed question of fact and law that can
be subject to de novo appellate review.
This conclusion has been implicitly recognized by Justice Ginsburg,
who has argued that
[o]ne million dollars' worth of pain and suffering does not exist as a
"fact" in the world any more or less than one million dollars' worth
of moral outrage. Both derive their meaning from a set of underly-
ing facts as determined by a jury. If one exercise in quantification is
properly regarded as factfinding, it seems to me the other should be
so regarded as well.55
Since the Court has concluded that the jury award of punitive dam-
ages does not involve a mere finding of fact, the equivalence identified
by Justice Ginsburg implies that an award of pain-and-suffering dam-
ages also does not involve exclusive factfinding by the jury. The jury's
award of damages for pain and suffering can be subjected to de novo
appellate review.
53. See supra notes 7-31 and accompanying text.
54. GRAHAM DOUTHWAITE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS §§ 6-17, at
274 (2d ed. 1988) (instructing jurors to use their "collective enlightened conscience"); ELEVENTH
CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 2.1 (West 1993) (instructing jurors that any award
for pain and suffering "should be fair and just in the light of the evidence").
55. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 446-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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The de novo review of any given award for pain and suffering would
seem to create the need for some type of guidelines for evaluating an
award, the approach adopted by the Court with respect to the judicial
review of a punitive damages award. 56 The way in which due process
has affected punitive damages practice fully illustrates the vulnerabil-
ity of pain-and-suffering damages to constitutional restriction.
V. THE TORT RIGHT: CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OR SOLUTION?
Just as the problem of due process can be traced to the tort right,
any solution to the problem must also be based upon that right. The
nature of the tort right determines the relevant state interests that are
promoted by an award of tort damages for pain and suffering. Ac-
cording to the Court, the due process inquiry "appropriately begins
with an identification of the state interests that a punitive award is
designed to serve. 57 So too, the due process inquiry for pain-and-
suffering damages must begin with the relevant state interests.
The nature of the tort right finds expression in the core concern of
tort law-the protection of individuals from physical harm, a category
encompassing harm to the individual interests in bodily integrity, land,
and chattels.5 8 To protect individuals from physical harm is to make
them physically secure with respect to these interests. The tort right
accordingly involves the individual interest in security of the body and
personal property.
An individual tort right to physical security means that the right-
holder's interest in physical security has some type of legal priority
over the competing liberty interests, including the economic interest,
of the duty-holder. 59 This priority explains why "the law has always
56. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (identifying
three factors that reviewing courts must consider when evaluating the constitutionality of a puni-
tive damages award).
57. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
58. The initial conceptualization of torts as a distinct field of law was largely accomplished by
Oliver Wendell Holmes. "Above all, his approach centered tort doctrine around its emerging
primary source of litigation, accidental personal injuries." Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1282 (2001). Today "[t]he problem of accidental personal injury and prop-
erty damage" remains at "the core of tort law .... " RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GEN-
ERAL PRINCIPLES reporter's introductory note (Discussion Draft 1999).
59. The conceptual properties of individual rights are contestable, but an essential attribute of
a right is captured by the notion that individual rights serve as "trumps over some background
justification for political decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole." Ronald N.
Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). An indi-
vidual right, in other words, places limits or constraints on the types of reasons that justify gov-
ernmental actions, including the formulation and enforcement of tort rules. See Jeremy
Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin's Theory of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 301 (2000) (explaining why
this interpretation of Dworkin's formulation of rights as "trumps" is appropriate). An auton-
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placed a higher value upon human safety than upon mere rights in
property. '60 The basic idea is that the right-holder's physical security
cannot be compromised merely because doing so would confer greater
wealth or welfare on others. One cannot be subjected to the harvest
of his or her organs, for example, merely because the transplants in
others would somehow make society better off. The tort right pro-
tects the individual interest in bodily integrity from these types of
forced social redistributions. 6t To provide such protection, the tort
right prioritizes the right-holder's security interest over the conflicting
liberty or economic interests of the duty-holder.
Due to the interpersonal priority of the security interest over the
economic interest, the individual tort right has no objective monetary
equivalent. The "victim's right not to be harmed" is not "commensu-
rate with money," since the right-holder's interest in physical security
and the duty-holder's interest in money "are not conceptually equated
as fungible commodities. '62
Even though the tort right is not commensurate with money, it is a
separate question whether there is an appropriate method for protect-
ing the right with a monetary damages award. The tort right held by
an individual both creates and corresponds to an individual duty in-
curred by another.63 By breaching this duty, the duty-holder becomes
responsible to the right-holder for the injuries caused by the rights-
omy-promoting individual right, for example, can exclude any social justification for tort liability
that is inconsistent with the concern for autonomy. Within such a rights-based system, the secur-
ity interest of each individual has priority over the liberty interests of others. See, e.g., Stephen
R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective Justice and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD
ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE: FOURTH SERIES 237, 239 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000); see also ER-
NEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 202 n.73 (1995) ("Under Kantian right, bodily integ-
rity is an innate right and thus prior to acquired rights of property."). Both security and liberty
are important aspects of autonomy, but individuals must be secure in their persons and property
before they can meaningfully exercise their liberty, thereby justifying the interpersonal priority
of the security interest as a matter of autonomy. As I have argued at length elsewhere, this
priority of interests explains the important substantive doctrines of tort law. See generally
Geistfeld, supra note 18. But even if this particular priority does not underlie the tort right, the
very nature of a right to physical security means that tort law must give some sort of legal prior-
ity to that interest over the conflicting liberty interests of the duty-holder. For example, the rule
of negligence liability is based upon the interpersonal priority of the right-holder's security inter-
est over the unreasonable liberty interest of the duty-holder, thereby justifying a duty that bur-
dens the subordinate liberty interests to compensate harms inflicted upon the legally superior
security interests.
60. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 21, at 132 (5th
ed. 1984).
61. The rationale for the tort right determines the appropriateness of any social redistribution.
If the right is formulated to promote individual autonomy, for example, then redistributions are
permissible as long as they find justification in the concern for autonomy. See supra note 59.
62. Radin, supra note 5, at 61.
63. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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violation. The right-duty nexus provides a method for determining
the appropriate damages award in a manner that does not pose a
problem of due process. This approach is most easily illustrated by
product cases, although it generalizes to other tort cases as well.
A. Product Cases
The tort right involves an interpersonal priority of the right-holder's
security interest over the conflicting liberty and economic interests of
the duty-holder. Such an interpersonal conflict of interests does not
arise in most product cases-those involving product sellers and con-
sumers. By selling a product, the manufacturer creates the risk of
physical injury to which the consumer is exposed. Any tort burdens
incurred by the manufacturer-the cost of safety precautions and in-
jury compensation-are passed onto the consumer in the form of
higher prices. Consequently, "it is not a factor. .. that the imposition
of liability would have a negative effect on corporate earnings or
would reduce employment in a given industry. ' 64 Product cases only
implicate an intrapersonal conflict of the consumer's interests in physi-
cal security and liberty or money. 65
In comparing his or her own security and liberty interests, the con-
sumer gives no special priority to either one. The consumer prefers to
pay for product safety only if the benefit of risk reduction (borne by
the consumer) exceeds the cost of the safety investment (also borne
by the consumer via the associated price increase). Consumers rea-
sonably expect product safety decisions to be governed by a cost-ben-
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998).
65. To be sure, tort liability will increase costs, which in turn will affect price, aggregate de-
mand, and the net profits of product sellers. These impacts on the interests of product sellers are
not relevant to the analysis, however. The equilibrium price must cover all of the seller's costs,
including liability costs. At this baseline, the consumer pays for the full cost of tort liability.
Another baseline could alter the conclusion. Given a baseline of no liability, the adoption of tort
liability would increase cost and price, which in turn could decrease aggregate demand and
thereby reduce price. The price reduction induced by the reduction in demand means that from
a baseline of no liability, consumers need not bear the full cost of tort liability, depending on the
relevant elasticities. See Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361 (1991). The appropriate base-
line accordingly determines whether or not consumers incur the full cost of tort liability. The
appropriate baseline cannot be determined by economic analysis, since cost-benefit analysis de-
pends on prices which in turn depend on the initial allocation of property rights. See Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
TmE LAW 679 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). The initial allocation of property rights must instead
depend upon normative justification, and so the normatively justified tort rule defines the appro-
priate baseline for evaluating the distributive impact of tort liability. At this baseline, the con-
sumer pays for the full cost of tort liability, since the equilibrium price must cover all of the
seller's costs, including its liability costs. The normatively justified tort rule accordingly only
depends upon consideration of these consumer interests.
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efit calculus because that decisional rule maximizes consumer well-
being or welfare. 66 The adequate protection of a consumer's tort right
therefore depends upon cost-benefit analysis, even though the tort
right is not commensurate with money.
In product cases, the tort system relies upon a cost-benefit liability
rule commonly called the risk-utility test.67 This rule gives the product
seller a duty to make any safety investment having a total cost, disutil-
ity, or burden B that is less than the risk the consumer would face if
the safety investment were not made. The consumer reasonably eval-
uates the risk in terms of the expected injury costs created by the risk,
an amount determined by the probability of accident P multiplied by
the magnitude of loss L. To focus on pain and suffering, we can de-
compose the loss into the constituent parts involving physical harms,
emotional harms, and economic harms. So defined, the risk-utility
test gives product sellers the duty to make any safety investments sat-
isfying the following condition:
B < P * (Lhysical + LEmotional + LEconomic)
This duty can be enforced by the courts only if the injury costs for
the pain and suffering (the term LEmotional) are somehow monetized
(like the associated terms Lphysical and LEconomic). Without a monetary
amount for the pain and suffering, the court and the product seller
cannot determine the safety expenditures required by the duty of care.
The liability rule would not maximize consumer welfare or provide
the best protection for consumer interests as required by the tort
right, nor would the liability rule give constitutionally adequate notice
to the product seller as duty-holder.
This attribute of the right or duty can be determined by the reason-
able safety preferences of the consumer as right-holder. To see why,
suppose there is a 1-in-10,000 chance of suffering the nonmonetary
injury (the term P). The safety decision requires a monetary valuation
of the nonmonetary injury (the term LEmotional). That amount depends
upon the consumer's subjective preference for spending money to
eliminate this particular risk of experiencing the pain and suffering.
Suppose the consumer honestly says he or she is willing to pay no
more than $10 to eliminate the risk. Since $10 is the most the con-
sumer would pay to eliminate the risk, he or she must be indifferent
66. See generally MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2006) (explain-
ing why the ordinary consumer reasonably expects the amount of product safety required by
cost-benefit analysis and showing how this principle explains the important substantive doctrines
of products liability).
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
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between incurring the cost of $10 or otherwise incurring the expected
injury cost of the pain and suffering:
$10 = P * LEmotional
$10 = (1/10,000) - LEmotional
$100,000 = LEmotional
In making the safety decision defined by the duty of care, the con-
sumer would prefer that this particular pain-and-suffering injury be
monetized at $100,000. A different injury (or even a different
probability of injury) would yield a different number. The monetiza-
tion of the pain-and-suffering injury does not represent the "value" of
the injury or the amount of money the consumer would accept in ex-
change for suffering the injury with certainty. When framed in those
terms, the consumer could be willing to spend everything to avoid the
most severe nonmonetary injury-the loss of life's pleasures due to
wrongful death. The value of the injury, however, is not relevant to
the safety issue in this particular case. The issue is one of determining
the appropriate amount of safety expenditures for eliminating a 1-in-
10,000 chance of suffering the nonmonetary injury, and for this pur-
pose the consumer would reasonably prefer that the pain and suffer-
ing be monetized at $100,000.68
This method for monetizing the pain-and-suffering injury is based
upon established economic methodology commonly employed by reg-
ulatory agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, in de-
vising regulations for the protection of human health and safety.69
The method also satisfies the relevant tort requirements.
Tort damages depend upon compensation for an existing injury and
not merely the risk of suffering a future injury. 70 This fundamental
tort requirement does not make the risk of injury irrelevant, however.
The jury cannot base the damages award for an existing injury on the
amount of money the victim would require to accept the certainty of
68. For further explanation of these points, including formal demonstration, see Mark
Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort
Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773 (1995).
69. Pursuant to executive order, federal agencies must analyze proposed regulations with a
cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1988); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994). To
apply cost-benefit analysis to a regulation concerning human health and safety, the impact of the
regulation on physical injuries and premature death must be quantified and monetized. For a
description of how this can be done, see, e.g., GEORGE TOLLEY ET AL., VALUING HEALTH FOR
POLICY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH (1994).
70. For example, the plaintiff in a negligence claim must prove "[alctual loss or damage. ...




suffering the injury.7' Tort compensation for existing injuries must
somehow depend upon risk rather than certainty. In the foregoing
example, the damages remedy of $100,000 is based upon the linkage
between the injury and its underlying risk. The $100,000 compensates
the plaintiff for the actual injury and not merely the risk, but does so
in the manner required by the tort rule that the damages award can-
not be based upon the certainty of injury.
For this same reason, the damages award can be fully compensatory
even though it does not make the plaintiff "whole." A straight ex-
change of money for the injury in question would make the plaintiff
"whole" in the sense that the money required by the plaintiff would
restore his welfare to the level he had enjoyed prior to the injury. Tort
law does not permit the damages award to be based upon such an
exchange. This prohibition explains why monetary damages for pain
and suffering are not supposed to "restore the person to his previous
position," but should instead "give to the injured person some pecuni-
ary return for what he has suffered or is likely to suffer."'72 Any
amount of money would provide "some pecuniary return" and would
appear to satisfy this requirement, but presumably tort law is more
demanding in this respect. Tort damages are supposed to be fully
compensatory. The damages award of $100,000 is fully compensatory
from the perspective of the plaintiff at the time of the risk exposure.
At that time, the plaintiff would have reasonably monetized the injury
at $100,000, and so the damages award fully compensates the plaintiff
for the injury in this sense.
The same conclusion holds if the damages award is conceptualized
as a means of redressing the violation of the plaintiff's tort right. The
71. Courts do not let jurors determine the award by asking themselves how much money they
or anyone else would want in exchange for experiencing the plaintiff's injury. See generally L. R.
James, Annotation, Instructions in a Personal Injury Action Which, in Effect, Tell Jurors That in
Assessing Damages They Should Put Themselves in Injured Person's Place, 96 A.L.R.2d 760
(1964); see also 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.10, at 563-64 (2d ed.
1986) ("All agree that [full compensation for pain and suffering] does not mean the sum that the
plaintiff-or anyone else-would be willing to suffer the injury for."). The courts have rejected
this method for determining damages because it invites sympathy or bias by the jurors. James,
supra, at 761. The source of the sympathy or bias must involve neglect of the underlying risk of
injury for reasons that can be illustrated by a severely disabling physical injury. An individual
may not be willing to accept any amount of money to suffer this injury with certainty, whereas he
or she would be willing to accept a finite amount of money to face a low risk of suffering the
injury. A damages award based upon the certainty of injury therefore can vastly exceed an
award based upon the actual risk of injury faced by the plaintiff, so jury instructions framed in
terms of the certainty of injury clearly bias the determination of damages for physical injury.
The only way to eliminate the bias is to somehow base the damages award on the underlying risk
of injury.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1977).
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rights-violation involves the defendant-product-seller's breach of the
duty of care owed to the plaintiff-consumer that caused the injuries
for which the plaintiff seeks compensation. The duty of care mone-
tized the pain-and-suffering injury at $100,000, and so a breach of that
duty can be redressed by obligating the defendant to pay the plaintiff
$100,000 for this aspect of the rights-violation.
The damages award does not represent the monetary equivalent of
the tort right or even the injury itself. A manufacturer that willfully
disregards the plaintiff's tort right does not fully satisfy its obligations
by paying compensatory damages. In such cases, the plaintiff can re-
ceive punitive damages to punish and deter the defendant manufac-
turer from the wrongdoing. 73 An award of compensatory damages
therefore does not represent the monetary equivalent of the tort right
or the "price" the duty-holder can choose to pay in exchange for will-
fully taking the right. The $100,000 also does not represent the value
of the injury, since the plaintiff presumably would not accept that
amount in exchange for the certainty of experiencing the pain and
suffering. The damages award only represents the "price" or moneti-
zation of the injury in the particular circumstances of the case-the
amount of money that is required to redress this aspect of the way in
which the defendant violated the plaintiff's tort right. The nature of
the rights-violation in product cases therefore translates into a specific
method for determining pain-and-suffering damages.
To implement this approach, the jury could first be informed about
the methodology and its rationale. The jury could then be provided
with a specific probability, such as 1-in-10,000, that the defect would
cause the particular pain-and-suffering injury in question. (The spe-
cific probability need only be based upon the best available evidence
in order to satisfy the evidentiary standard governing damage deter-
minations.74) The jury could also be given information about how to
conceptualize a probability of this magnitude. For example, the jury
might benefit from learning that there is an average risk of 1-in-10,000
that an individual will die in a commercial plane crash over the course
73. See supra Part II.
74. As the Court has held in a different context, the plaintiff faces less demanding evidentiary
requirements "[w]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty .. " Story. Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931). If ordinary evidentiary requirements were applied in these cases, "it
would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured per-
son, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts." Id. To achieve
justice, the evidence required of the plaintiff in the damages phase must fairly account for the
factual uncertainty created by the defendant's tortious conduct, resulting in a legal standard
requiring proof with the evidence that is reasonably available given the limitations created by
the defendant's tortious misconduct.
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of one hundred flights. 75 The jury also receives evidence about the
injury in question, making it relatively well informed about the nature
and severity of the pain and suffering. On the basis of all this informa-
tion, the jury is likely to provide a reasonably good determination of
the damages award.76
Under this approach, the jury's determination of pain-and-suffering
damages is also appropriately characterized as a finding of fact. In
effect, the jury is deciding how much money a well-informed con-
sumer in the plaintiff's position would have been willing to pay for the
particular safety precaution at issue in the case. The issue depends
upon consumer preferences, making it the type of issue that is most
defensibly determined by members of the community (the jury) rather
than judges. Hence the jury's damages determination should be given
the maximal amount of deference from judges, the result attained by
characterizing the damages determination as a finding of fact.
Unlike current tort practice, this approach does not pose any signifi-
cant problems of due process. Rather than telling juries to award
pain-and-suffering damages that are "just and reasonable," this ap-
proach would enable judges to provide more precise guidance about
what justice or fairness requires in these cases. In product cases not
involving bystanders, the fair tort rule provides the best protection of
consumer interests, making it appropriate for jurors to determine the
maximum amount of money the plaintiff consumer would have been
willing to pay to eliminate the relevant risk (such as 1-in-10,000) of
experiencing only this particular pain-and-suffering injury. 77 This
75. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGU-
LATION 5 (1993).
76. See Geistfeld, supra note 68, at 832-40. To be sure, the jury will make mistakes, and so
one can usefully criticize the method in this respect. See Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on
Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal
for Change, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 87, 106-08 (2005) (identifying various reasons why jurors are
likely to make mistakes in calculating damage awards based on risk measures). The problem of
jury mistake highlights the importance of formulating jury instructions to overcome heuristics
and biases that might otherwise plague the jury's decisionmaking. These jury mistakes do not
sufficiently justify alternative methods for calculating the award, however, because the jury must
make the same type of decision in order to apply the risk-utility test or otherwise determine the
precautions required of the duty-holder. The jury could not appropriately make this decision by
relying on a damages schedule or some other method for determining pain-and-suffering dam-
ages that does not base the award on the underlying right-duty nexus. As long as the right-duty
nexus requires the jury to monetize nonmonetary injuries, this type of jury mistake is inevitable.
Once the problem is conceptualized in these terms, the approach described in the text might
even reduce jury mistakes insofar as it improves upon jury decisionmaking with respect to the
risk-utility test and similar safety inquiries required by the duty of care.
77. To keep the jury from double-counting damages, the jury instructions must explain that
the pain-and-suffering damages depend upon the plaintiff's willingness to pay to eliminate only
the risk of the pain and suffering. The risk must exclude the other injuries suffered by the
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method of calculating the damages award is just and reasonable be-
cause it monetizes the injury in the manner that adequately protects
the plaintiff's tort right. Under this approach, the damages award
would no longer be the mystical result of some process of "guesstima-
tion," but instead would defensibly provide redress for the rights-vio-
lation suffered by the plaintiff consumer.
B. Tort Cases in Noncontractual Settings
When the parties to a tort suit have no preexisting contractual rela-
tionship, any tort costs incurred by the duty-holder cannot be passed
onto the right-holder via increased contractual prices. The tort obliga-
tions incurred by automobile drivers, for example, are not directly
borne by pedestrians. These cases involve an interpersonal conflict of
interests between the duty-holder and right-holder, a conflict that can
justify liability rules requiring more than the cost-benefit amount of
safety. 78 But even if the liability rule is not formulated in cost-benefit
terms, the standard of care requires some comparison of the cost of
precaution and the associated risk of injury that would be eliminated
by the precaution. A rights-based liability rule must equally respect
the right-holder and duty-holder. For example, a tort right based on
the concern for individual autonomy must give equal respect to the
autonomy of the right-holder and duty-holder. Since the rights-based
tort rule cannot ignore the duty-holder's interests, the standard of rea-
sonable care must somehow compare the duty-holder's burden of tak-
ing a precaution B with the associated threat to the right-holder's
security interest PL. Therein lies the method for determining pain-
and-suffering damages.
Suppose the standard of care requires precautions imposing a bur-
den B on the duty-holder that is not disproportionately greater (de-
noted >>) than the risk in question:
B >> P 9 (LPhysical + LEmotional + LEconomic)
plaintiff. Inclusion of these other injuries would increase the maximum amount of money that
the plaintiff would be willing to pay, thereby increasing the damages award in a manner that
includes compensation for both these injuries and the pain and suffering. Alternatively, the jury
could determine the plaintiff's willingness to pay to eliminate the entire risk of injury. The resul-
tant damages award would include compensation for both monetary and nonmonetary injuries.
The monetary component could then be subtracted from the total award (assuming that the
other forms of proof for monetary damages are more reliable), and the remainder would involve
the jury's implicit determination of the award for pain-and-suffering. Under this latter approach,
the jury's decision with respect to the safety issue in the case would exactly correspond to its
decision on damages.
78. See Geistfeld, supra note 18, at 602-08. For a brief explanation of the reasons behind this
conclusion, see infra note 79.
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By requiring safety investments above the cost-benefit amount, this
standard of care gives the right-holder's security interest priority over
the duty-holder's liberty interest, while also enabling the duty-holder
to engage in the activity in order to promote his or her autonomy.
Even if it is not based upon cost-benefit analysis, the standard of care
requires some method for comparing the cost of a precaution with the
risk reduction. Presumably, that method should reasonably protect
the right in question.
Suppose there is a 1-in-10,000 chance of suffering the nonmonetary
injury (the term P). The standard of care requires a monetary valua-
tion of the nonmonetary injury (the term LEmotional). That amount de-
pends upon the right-holder's reasonable preferences for determining
how much money should be spent to reduce this particular risk of in-
jury. Suppose the right-holder honestly says that he or she is willing
to accept at least $12 to face the risk. Since $12 is the lowest amount
the right-holder requires in order to face the risk, he or she must be
indifferent between receiving the $12 or otherwise incurring the ex-
pected injury cost of the pain and suffering:
$12 = P ° LEmotional
$12 = (1/10,000) ° LEmotional
$120,000 = LEmotional
In making the safety decision defined by the duty of care, the right-
holder is willing to monetize this particular pain-and-suffering injury
at $120,000. A different injury (or even a different probability of in-
jury) would yield a different number. As before, the monetization of
the pain-and-suffering injury does not represent the "value" of the
injury or the amount of money the right-holder would accept in ex-
change for suffering the injury with certainty. When framed in those
terms, the amount could be infinite for the most severe nonmonetary
injury-the loss of life's pleasures due to wrongful death. The sub-
stantive requirements of the tort duty do not depend upon the value
of the injury, however. The issue is one of determining the appropri-
ate amount of safety for eliminating a 1-in-10,000 risk of suffering the
nonmonetary injury, and for this purpose the right-holder would rea-
sonably monetize the pain and suffering at $120,000.
This method for determining damages has some important differ-
ences with the analogous method for product cases, but the damages
award still provides the appropriate redress for the rights-violation. 79
79. When the monetization of the injury depends upon the right-holder's willingness to pay to
reduce risk as in most product cases, the right-holder, by definition, is not entitled to receive any
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As in product cases, the award for pain and suffering can be defined in
terms of the defendant's duty of care. To violate the plaintiff's tort
right, the defendant must have breached the duty of care in a manner
that caused injury to the plaintiff. The fact of breach is not sufficient,
nor is the fact of injury. The rights-violation necessarily requires con-
sideration of both the standard of care and the resultant injury. The
rights-violation therefore can be defensibly redressed by a damages
remedy based upon the manner in which the standard of care accounts
for the injury in question. 0
With respect to the issue of due process, the approach is entirely
analogous to product cases. When jury instructions are formulated in
these terms, the damages determination no longer suffers from the
inherent indeterminacy or vagueness that now plagues this important
form of tort liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of what one thinks about the U.S. Supreme Court's
foray into tort reform, its emphasis on due process requires one to
think hard about the problem of vague and uncertain tort rules. As a
consequence of the due process challenge to tort law, it may no longer
be sufficient to justify indeterminate pain-and-suffering damages as
means of recognizing the inappropriateness of equating money with
money prior to the risk exposure. But when the monetization of the injury depends upon the
right-holder's willingness to accept money in exchange for facing the risk of injury, then the
right-holder is entitled to receive the risk proceeds, making her ability to receive the money of
critical importance. (Absent the receipt of money, why face the risk?) In noncontractual set-
tings, the right-holder could receive the risk proceeds in the form of a damages payment as per
the damages method proposed in text. But if the injury reduces the right-holder's ability to
enjoy the money (premature death being the extreme example), then tort damages cannot be
fully compensatory in this sense. In my view, this compensatory problem explains why tort law
does not ordinarily define the standard of care in cost-benefit terms. When the standard of care
requires more than the cost-benefit amount of safety, the duty-holder is forced to spend the
money on injury prevention rather than damages compensation, producing a more fair outcome
between the parties. See generally Geistfeld, supra note 18. The resultant emphasis on the stan-
dard of care further underscores the importance of tailoring the damages award to the standard
of care.
80. Damages for the intentional torts and the strict liability torts can also be determined in
this manner. If the defendant intentionally commits the harm, then there is no reason why the
jury cannot determine damages by asking how much money the victim would require in ex-
change for suffering the injury. The defendant intentionally took the victim's health and can be
made to pay accordingly. When the liability is strict, the damages no longer depend upon the
certainty of injury, and instead require resorting to the underlying risk of injury as in the cases
involving negligence liability. See supra note 71; see also Mark A. Geistfeld, Necessity and the
Logic of Strict Liability, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2005), available at http://www.bepress.
com/ils (explaining why the rules of strict liability critically depend upon the magnitude of the
underlying risk).
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the right to bodily security. As the Court has held, "[T]he Due Pro-
cess Clause does not permit a State to classify arbitrariness as a
virtue." 8'
Even if this damages practice passes constitutional muster, the ideal
of due process does not disappear. As compared to current practice,
the tort system could adopt a more constitutionally defensible method
for determining pain-and-suffering damages by being more true to the
constitutional values of notice, predictability, and reasoned decision-
making. Such a tort system may also be more secure from legislative
reforms like the tort-reform bill passed by the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives in March 1995, which capped pain-and-suffering damages in
a section of the bill entitled "Limitation on Speculative and Arbitrary
Damage Awards."8 2
As the issue of pain-and-suffering damages illustrates, the tort sys-
tem can be guided by the ideal of due process without abandoning its
reliance on fairness and individual rights. In a rights-based tort sys-
tem, damages for pain and suffering provide redress for rights-viola-
tions. Money is not equivalent with the right, nor can money
represent the value of the pain and suffering. These characteristics of
the tort right do not imply that there is no method for determining the
appropriate form of redress for a rights-violation. A tort right creates
a corresponding duty of care for the duty-holder. To determine the
safety precautions required of the duty-holder, the standard of care
must monetize pain-and-suffering injuries. To violate the plaintiff's
right, the defendant must have breached the duty of care in a manner
that caused injury to the plaintiff, making it appropriate to redress the
rights-violation by relying on the way in which the standard of care
monetizes the injury. Not only does the nature of the tort right pro-
vide a method for determining the amount of damages, it also pro-
vides the foundation for a tort award that can be securely defended
from constitutional attack.
81. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417-18 (2003) (quoting Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
82. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995) (capping pain-and-suffering damages in any healthcare
liability action). The final version of the bill as adopted by both the House and Senate did not
describe or limit the damages in this manner. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted).
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